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Ray Madoff       Roger Colinvaux 
Professor of Law      Professor of Law 
Director, Forum on Philanthropy & the Public Good Columbus School of Law 
Boston College Law School     The Catholic University of America  
885 Centre Street      3600 John McCormack Rd., NE 
Newton, MA 02459      Washington, DC 20064 
 
July 17, 2017 
 
The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch Chairman 
Committee on Finance 
United States Senate 
219 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
 
Dear Chairman Hatch, 
 
We write in response to your request to stakeholders for input on tax reform, specifically with 
respect to the tax treatment of 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. We are professors of law at 
Boston College (Ray Madoff) and The Catholic University of America (Roger Colinvaux). 
Professor Madoff founded and directs the Forum on Philanthropy and the Public Good, which 
focuses on ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the rules governing the charitable 
sector. Professor Colinvaux served for years on the Joint Committee on Taxation and writes 
extensively about tax policy and nonprofits. 
 
The charitable sector in the United States is a source of strength and pride for all Americans, 
irrespective of party. Charitable giving by individuals exceeds $250 billion every year and helps 
to fund a nonprofit sector that provides vital social services, education, health care, spiritual 
sustenance, scientific research and many more essential aspects of American civil society. The 
nonprofit sector is also a critical part of the economy and a source of employment for the 
nation’s workforce.  
 
The main reason for charitable tax benefits is to increase the flow of dollars to organizations 
engaged in charitable work. But right now, too many tax-subsidized contributions are being set-
aside indefinitely—subject to no obligation for them ever to be put to active charitable use. 
 
Accordingly, we focus our comments on two areas: channeling the incredible fundraising 
success of donor-advised funds to encourage more distributions from these funds to active 
charities; and improving the impact of private foundations by closing a loophole in the minimum 
payout rule and by making incentives for larger payouts more effective. 
 
Establish a Payout Period for Donor-Advised Funds  
 
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) have been one of the remarkable stories in charitable fundraising. 
DAFs operate like charitable checking accounts, where donors set funds aside in charitable 
vehicles and retain the power to advise distributions from their DAF accounts for charitable 
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purposes. From their infancy in the 1990s when the first commercially affiliated funds formed 
until today, DAFs have grown to dominate the charitable landscape. As reported by the 
Chronicle of Philanthropy, Fidelity Charitable is today’s largest charity in terms of donations 
(surpassing all others by more than 20%). It is not alone, as DAF sponsors constitute five of the 
nation’s top eleven charities. Given the regular double-digit growth of DAFs, there is every 
reason to think that this trend will continue.    
 
Yet despite the tremendous growth of contributions to DAFs, charitable giving has remained flat 
at roughly two percent of disposable personal income. This suggests that DAFs are not 
increasing overall giving, but instead are attracting dollars that would otherwise be contributed 
directly to active nonprofits.  
 
Understandably, DAFs are an attractive option because of their flexibility. Donors can time their 
charitable giving to achieve maximum tax benefits while still retaining the ability to advise 
where and when those funds will be directed. However, because current law does not require 
payouts from DAFs, donors may indefinitely defer charitable distributions from their DAF 
accounts, even across generations. While some individuals distribute their DAF accounts entirely 
within a single year, others make no distributions at all. While some DAF sponsors have high 
overall distribution rates, according to the IRS, a full 25 percent of DAF sponsors distributed less 
than one percent of their assets in a year.1 Even for those DAF sponsors with higher payouts, the 
reported rates can be misleading because they include distributions to other donor-advised funds, 
which can be substantial.2  
 
We recognize the convenience and tax benefits that DAFs offer to donors. However, the public 
value of DAFs does not occur until such time as funds come out of the DAF sponsor and make 
their way to active charities. Given the substantial sums flowing into DAFs, the significant tax 
benefits allowed for these contributions, and the ultimate purpose of charitable tax benefits to get 
money to organizations engaged in charitable work, we believe that Congress should impose a 
maximum time period for DAF accounts to be distributed to non-DAF charities. This could 
easily be accomplished by requiring donors (as a condition of the deduction) to name a non-DAF 
charity that would receive any undistributed funds at the end of the designated period.3 For 
example, if Congress were to impose a maximum time period of 10 years, then a donor who 																																																								
1 Paul Arnsberger, Donor-Advised Funs: An Overview Using IRS Data (2015). 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=philanthropy-forum. There are several 
reasons why donors with the best of intentions may leave their donations in DAF accounts: charitable giving is 
difficult and donors may worry about spending unwisely, or may delay their giving due to procrastination or inertia. 
Further, there is a psychological allure to watching investments grow, particularly investments that are committed to 
good.  
2 According to a recent article in The Economist, Fidelity Charitable was the top recipient of distributions from three 
of the largest commercially affiliated DAF sponsors -- Fidelity, Schwab and Vanguard. In addition, the third largest 
recipient was the American Endowment Fund, another DAF sponsor.	https://www.economist.com/news/finance-
and-economics/21719494-rise-dafs-may-be-much-about-tax-charity-philanthropic-boom 
3 We believe that it would be a mistake to follow the five percent payout model applicable to private foundations. 
An annual payout rule would remove the flexibility of donor-advised funds without significantly increasing the flow 
of dollars to nonprofits. Experience with private foundations suggests that donors are susceptible to treating floors as 
ceilings and therefore they may be more likely to think of their DAFs as perpetual accounts. In addition, since DAFs 
are sponsored by public charities, donors receive significantly greater tax advantages for their contributions to 
DAFs. As a result, it makes sense for DAFs to be subject to stricter payout terms.  
 3 
funds a DAF in 2017 would be required to name a charity that would receive any remaining 
funds in the 2017 account by 2027.4 DAFs would maintain their flexibility because donors could 
change their charitable designations by simply making distributions from that account before the 
termination date. A maximum distribution period would not undermine the effectiveness of 
DAFs or their appeal to donors. It would simply establish a limit that would ensure that tax-
benefitted dollars are granted to nonprofits within a reasonable period of time. 
 
Prohibit Private Foundations from Using DAFs to Satisfy their Payout Obligations 
 
In 1969 Congress became concerned that private foundations were providing too many tax 
benefits to donors, without any assurances that donated funds would benefit the public in a 
timely manner. In order to address this concern, Congress enacted a rule that required private 
foundations to distribute roughly five percent of their assets each year to public charities.5 
Sensibly, the payout rule could not be evaded by a private foundation making distributions to 
other private foundations, because then the funds would simply await further distribution by that 
foundation.  
 
Since the rise of donor-advised funds, some private foundations have been meeting their payout 
requirements by making grants to DAFs that are established by the foundation.6 The foundation 
can then advise distribution of the grant from the DAF to an active charity at a later date. This 
can have multiple benefits for the foundation: one is that the transfer counts for purposes of the 
foundation’s payout (because the DAF sponsor is a public charity); another is that the foundation 
can disguise the source of the funding by flowing the funds through a DAF.  
 
Neither of these benefits is consistent with the spirit of the rules that have governed private 
foundation conduct since 1969. The payout is intended to measure distributions to active 
charities, not to other investment funds. Further, because of the potential for abuse at 
foundations, they are held to higher standards of transparency. Allowing foundation to DAF 
transfers to count for payout purposes is inconsistent with the policies behind the private 
foundation payout and disclosure rules. 
 
In order to address these concerns, Congress should provide that foundation to DAF transfers are 
not “qualifying distributions” for purposes of a private foundation’s payout. 
 
Encourage Private Foundation Distributions Through a Modified Excise Tax 
 
Under current law, private foundations are generally subject to a two percent excise tax on their 
investment income. However, if a private foundation increases its annual distribution over its 																																																								
4Multiple contributions could simply be grouped by year so that all 2017 contributions would be allocated to the 
2017 fund (with an outside distribution date of 2027) and 2018 contributions would be allocated to the 2018 fund 
(with an outside distribution date of 2028).  
5 Qualifying distributions also include funds spent directly for charitable purposes.  
6 The Economist found that some private foundations distribute 90% of their qualifying distributions to DAFs. 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21719494-rise-dafs-may-be-much-about-tax-charity-
philanthropic-boom 
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historic distribution rate, then for that year the excise tax is reduced to one percent. This two-
tiered system was intended to reward private foundations that make progressively larger grants. 
 
Private foundations have long sought to repeal the two-tiered excise tax in favor of a single one 
percent excise tax. The argument in favor of repeal is that the two-tiered system is complicated, 
and, paradoxically, can sometimes discourage large distributions because it can make it harder 
for the private foundation to qualify for the lower excise tax rate in subsequent years.  
 
Although these arguments have merit, we believe that it is possible to simplify the excise tax and 
fix the design flaw. To that end, Congress could provide that private foundations are subject to a 
two percent excise tax (as currently) but the tax will be reduced to one percent in any year in 
which their qualifying distributions are six percent or greater; the tax could be reduced further to 
zero when qualifying distributions are at least eight percent. A mechanism such as this would 
simplify the excise tax while still retaining an incentive in the tax code for private foundations to 
make qualifying distributions above the statutory minimum of five percent, which too often has 
served as a ceiling on private foundation annual grant making. 
 
* * * 
 
It has been almost fifty years since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 – the last 
seminal reform of charitable organizations. Today, charities still serve the neediest among us, 
strengthen civil society, promote pluralism, reduce the burdens on government, and fuel our 
economy. To accomplish these results, charities still depend on charitable donations. We believe 
that the modest changes we suggest in this letter would go a long way toward getting more 
dollars to active charitable nonprofits without creating significant new burdens on charities or 
undermining charitable giving.  
 
Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments, and please do not hesitate to be in touch 
with either of us if you would like to explore these issues further.7                             	
                                   	
																																								  
           
 
Ray Madoff       Roger Colinvaux 
Professor of Law      Professor of Law 
Director, Forum on Philanthropy & the Public Good Columbus School of Law 
Boston College Law School     The Catholic University of America  
																																																								
7 In the interest of brevity, we kept our discussion here to a minimum. We have both written about the issues 
discussed here in more detail, as well as other important issues affecting the charitable sector. Please let us know if 
you would like additional information.  
